

Looking at the paper:

By Sophia Siedlberg.

The question has been “Why are you smearing Professor J Michael Bailey” and this question was put to me by one Dr. David Greenberg (Not to be confused with Aaron Greenberg the co author of the original paper).

My answer was. “Well it speaks for itself” but in fairness to Dr. David Greenberg, yes I should take the time to put this across more clearly so here it is.

This is the Paper: Parental Selection of Children’s Sexual Orientation
Aaron S. Greenberg, JD,1 and J. Michael Bailey.

The Abstract reads:

As we learn more about the causes of sexual orientation, the likelihood increases that parents will one day be able to select the orientation of their children. This possibility (at least that of selecting for heterosexuality) has generated a great deal of concern among supporters of homosexual rights, with such selection being widely condemned as harmful and morally repugnant. Notwithstanding this widespread condemnation, and even assuming, as we do, that homosexuality is entirely acceptable morally, allowing parents, by means morally unproblematic in themselves, to select for heterosexuality would be morally acceptable. This is because allowing parents to select their children’s sexual orientation would further parent’s freedom to raise the sort of children they wish to raise and because selection for heterosexuality may benefit parents and children and is unlikely to cause significant harm.

This is interesting because to begin with the abstract seems to imply that there are relative moral values involved here, and that one should not be inconsistent. It seems clear that Professor Bailey was aware of the controversy that was about to happen by his first trying to explain his stance on those who find his work “Morally repugnant”. He then argues that parental choice is equally as much a right as would be gay rights. However in practice the suggestion is inconsistent.

He is actually suggesting that while one group have rights to live as they wish another (Intrinsically more valued) has the right to eliminate the potential presence of anyone of the first group from their family. It is a form of de-centralized eugenics. Rather than older programs of eugenics where a government hold on to an ideal and acted in it centrally by forcing an entire population to adopt the policies (Centralized eugenics) Professor Bailey goes by the “Opt in “ route playing to already known social prejudices. “The family next door have no gay members why should we” That is de-centralized eugenics. A form of which makes a point of giving the final freedom of choice (Over life and non-life quite literally) to the heterosexual man and woman.

No this is not the sort of eugenics peddled by past dictatorships (Such as the Nazis) but it is still eugenics.

The Text continues:

Introduction

Science continues to gain insight into the origins of particular sexual orientations and to provide us with more and more effective ways of controlling our environments and our genetic endowments. The combination of these two factors, knowledge and technology, will in all likelihood lead, at some point, to the ability of parents to control, or at least greatly influence, their children's sexual orientation. One would expect that the vast majority of parents inclined to attempt to influence the orientation of their children will wish to do so in the direction of heterosexuality. Are such parents little, if any, better than Nazi advocates of eugenics or can such actions be morally justified? In general, how should we evaluate such parental actions from an ethical standpoint?

This is indeed a curious question. Does Professor Bailey see such parental actions as “Nazi eugenics” (Now who is raising that specter, Not unusual with the good Professor) Professor Bailey answers this with:

Our purpose here is not to propose or defend any general ethical system. Instead, we will attempt to evaluate certain actions within the framework of what we perceive to be factors that are, in actuality, commonly taken into account in secular moral decision making. These include the action's costs and benefits (broadly construed) and the motives of the actor. Again, we will not attempt to provide a theoretical justification of the relevance of these factors to issues of morality. Rather, we will determine how selection of a child's sexual preference should be viewed if one accepts (as we believe a great many people do) that those factors, applied consistently and rationally, are crucial in making moral judgments.

This is a common methodology of persuasion. I know I am going against some good advice here, This sort of reasoning and methodology was used in past eugenics programs. Sadly yes it is true the Tiergartenstrasse 4 project was one example (This is the Nazi specter) but in fairness this rationalizing was common before then, As far back as Galton the father of modern eugenics. This now predictable obfuscation would take place before the discussion began.

The first question to confront is that of the ethical status of homosexuality itself. Certainly, whether homosexuality is good, bad, or neutral will be an important factor in our evaluation of attempts to avoid having homosexual children. Our position, which we will take as axiomatic for purposes of this discussion, is that homosexuality, like heterosexuality, is ethically neutral. Because homosexuality

causes no direct harm to others (other than those who take offense at it on irrational and/or inhumane grounds) and because homosexual behavior is crucial to the ability of homosexual people to enjoy their lives (as heterosexual behavior is to heterosexuals), homosexuality should not be morally condemned or proscribed.

Well yes, but we are reading about giving the parent the “Freedom of choice” to “Abort or screen out” a fetus because of some hypothetical genetic predisposition towards a homosexual orientation. If the “Axiomatic” position does not make sense it would only if the suggestion of removing heterosexual biased genomes from a family was given equal justification, it would not and could not be justified. The above is not a neutral statement rather it is a rationalization of the sort used by Galton and so on in the past.

The proposition, however, that there is nothing morally wrong with homosexuality by no means entails the proposition that there is something morally wrong with trying to avoid having homosexual children.

So therefore the “Axiomatic” neutrality has gone from the discussion. Very gently but gone all the same. It is a case of “Don’t blink or you will miss it”

To proscribe homosexuality is to do direct serious harm to a group of people with little countervailing benefit. In contrast, to avoid having homosexual children does no direct harm to anyone, as it involves no condemnation or proscription of anyone’s behavior or status. (By definition, if a child is kept from being homosexual, he or she will not have homosexual status or engage in homosexual behavior.) The ethical status of avoiding homosexual children depends instead on its indirect harms, if any, on its benefits, if any, and on the motives of those engaging in it.

It is called rhetorical pragmatism. To proscribe that homosexuality is bad, to proscribe that heterosexuality is good. It is not put quite that way but the meaning is the same. The underlying premise is that if no one is born with a homosexual orientation then all will be heterosexual and that will be “fair”. The intrinsic value of someone who has an orientation that results in breeding to produce screened stock (Let’s be truthful here) is higher than someone who has a “Homosexual status” that in this framework is determined in a predicate manner by deciding what constitutes “Genetically acceptable” and what does not.

Methods of Avoiding Homosexual Children and Grounds for Objection

There are, at least in theory, several possible ways in which having homosexual children could be avoided. These include refusal to conceive (for couples whose genetic characteristics make having a homosexual child likely), genetic manipulation, changes in pre- or postnatal environments, and abortion of fetuses likely to become homosexual children. Our purpose here is not to address the moral acceptability of any particular method but to focus on the propriety of parental selection of children's sexual orientation, quite apart from the method used to achieve that end.

Ah the “Axiomatic Rhetoric” returns, having spent something like two paragraphs doing a set of justifications “This is not eugenics, it looks like eugenics but it isn't, honest”. The reader by now still has all these images of past eugenics programs in their mind if they know the history of the subject. The rhetoric is the same, the ideology differs from the more extreme cases (The Nazis) but the rhetoric is almost identical to most eugenicists since Galton.

The analysis in this paper applies equally to any method of selection (ignoring those that are obviously morally unacceptable, such as infanticide) and for purposes of our analysis we assume that all such methods are, in themselves (that is, ignoring the particular purposes for which they are being employed), morally acceptable. In particular, we take no position on the moral status of abortion. If the reader has any moral question at all about abortion, we ask that he or she assume that some other, morally acceptable, method of selection (perhaps an intrauterine injection that alters the relevant genetic makeup of the fetus) will be used.

Basically we are reading “There is this method and people don't like it, then that method and people still don't like it, even so this has nothing to do with what we are saying, let's imagine we had this new method (In-utero somatic gene therapy which is very hypothetical and technically improbable). Professor Bailey suggests that this “Will be used” or implying that this will involve something already in the pipeline (Well yes there is Eric Vilain's work).

We will, however, at certain points, devote particular attention to abortion, as it seems often to be perceived as the most ethically problematic method.

Recent scientific studies have presented evidence that the chances that a child will be homosexual are greatly influenced by his or her genetic makeup

So in effect there is no control on the part of the unborn child to influence in any way shape or form why they are being eliminated. The child has “Bad blood” (To use a common euphemism from early eugenicists).

Researchers have in fact claimed to have identified the general location of the gene that appears to affect sexual orientation. These studies have provoked widespread reactions based on (in addition to their scientific implications) their perceived implications for law, ethics, and social policy. Indeed, in their initial scientific report, Hamer and colleagues took the step, unusual in a scientific research report, of explicitly opposing what they considered to be possible misuse of their findings. One response to the evidence that sexual orientation has an important genetic component has been the speculation that knowledge of the genetic origins of sexual orientation could lead to a prenatal test for homosexuality.

Well there is another possible reason Hamer does not agree, and that may have something to do with the technical limitations of such a “Genetic test”. However in the framework of this discussion we are still in the arena of justifications and persuasion “It is eugenics but not as we know it, it is cuddly eugenics”

*Parents who did not wish to have homosexual children could then abort fetuses likely to become homosexual. This possibility was even the premise of a controversial play (written prior to Hamer’s finding), *Twilight of the Gods*, in which an expectant mother wrestled with the dilemma of whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, which was likely to produce a homosexual child.*

You have noticed by now the never ending apologist justifications for “Eugenics but not really” has still when distilled becomes “Let’s give parents the right to eliminate a potential homosexual child, many object to this notion but we can think of some more tasteful methods of screening, let’s try in-utero genetic modification to allow the parents to save face”

The prospect of selective abortion to avoid having a homosexual child is considered by many to be morally repugnant. One may object morally to aborting a fetus because it is genetically destined to become homosexual, or more generally, to using any method that enables selection for heterosexuality, on one or more of the following grounds:

- 1. All uses of the method, for any purpose, are morally wrong (e.g., all abortions are wrong).*
- 2. Although some uses of the method may be morally acceptable, use of the method for the purpose of selecting the child’s characteristics is morally wrong.*
- 3. Although some uses of the method, including some for the purpose of selecting certain characteristics, may be morally acceptable, use of the method for the purpose of selecting heterosexuality is morally wrong.*

Right so now Professor Bailey accepts the technical limitations of more science fiction “Remedies” like in-utero gene therapy. But he has yet to give technical credence to this “Genetic test” that Hamer fears may be misused. Well this is unlikely to happen because no such test will ever be 100% reliable in predicting such an outcome and certainly does not justify abortion. What is not addressed in the three points above is the very real danger that abortion may take place because “There is a possibility of a predisposition to homosexuality” it is still only theoretical that the region Xq28 will result in a homosexual outcome).

I think the objection Professor Bailey has missed would be the tentative nature of the test. Would any parent simply abort because of an uncertain possibility? Would that be grounds enough for a “moral objection” that the “Test” has technical limitations as well. Well let’s look at what Professor Bailey does cite as objections. Professor Bailey continues:

Ground 1—Any Use of a Particular Method Is Wrong

It is not our purpose in this paper to address the question of the general morality of the use of any particular method that might enable selection for heterosexuality. For that reason, we will not discuss the merits and demerits of Ground 1, the general moral objection to the use of a particular method, other than to note that, as a basis for objecting to the avoidance of homosexual children, Ground 1 at least raises no consistency problems. As will be seen, this cannot be said of Grounds 2 and 3. Those grounds distinguish among interventions based on motives or purposes, and thus raise questions other than that of the general moral acceptability of a given method of intervention. It is, therefore, with Grounds 2 and 3 that we will concern ourselves.

Or “It has got nothing to do with us” Now notice the length of the following:

Ground 2—The Eugenics Objection

Ground 2 states a general moral objection to intervention for the purpose of selecting a child’s characteristics (whatever those characteristics might be). We may refer to this as the “eugenics” objection. This ground encompasses selection on the basis of characteristics as diverse as, let us say, severe brain damage to less-than-exceptional intelligence. Obviously, moral distinctions may be made on the basis of the characteristics involved but this possibility is addressed in the discussion of Ground 3, later. The objection stated in Ground 2 is not that it is wrong to select for certain characteristics, but rather that, regardless of the characteristic, such selection is wrong.

Well it can be technically risky. As I have already pointed out you screen out one characteristic only to cause another to emerge. I would say the wisdom should be “Better the devil (Mutation or expression) you know than the devil you don’t.” It has little to do with “Playing G-d, but more to do with the technical limitations of eugenics, limitations

which incidentally apply also to what Professor Bailey suggests. Which seems interesting because if the “Bailey methodology” is different from eugenics. How come the limitations are the same? Anyway here is where the fun starts:

Proponents of this position often seek to support it by (1) asserting that attempts to determine children’s characteristics through genetic manipulation or other such selection methods amounts to “playing God” (which apparently is assumed to be morally wrong or (2) equating such genetic manipulation or selection with certain practices engaged in or advocated by Nazi scientists or other historical proponents of eugenics.

I partly agree and disagree, the “Playing G-d” argument tends not to wash with me too much because as Professor Bailey says it is groundless when you consider that when someone crosses one type of crop with another to confer resistance to a given parasite they are “Playing G-d” and that has gone on for centuries. I do not agree with Professor Bailey trying to distance his methodology from that of eugenics simply because from a technical standpoint it is the same in all but name. The only considerable difference is that the decision of what characteristics are allowed and what are not, are given to the parents. Perhaps we can take the example I bring up from time to time, that illustrates this point.

There are many online gamete “Donation” (Trading) websites and services that offer gametes at different prices, the interesting thing is, those gametes from people who are blond haired and blue eyes seem to have a higher price. The question is “Would this be a de-centralized lebensborn project” (Lebensborn was the Nazi Super race breeding program where exactly the same characteristics were favored). Or is this a modern day example of market dynamics and “Freedom of choice”. Neither online gamete trading nor the Lebensborn Project would in truth have or will eliminate negative genetic characteristics.

I strongly suggest the progeny of either avoid ultra violet light or sun bathing for example. The whole idea is based on socially preferred characteristics, nothing more. Health issues do not really enter into it. I mean look if you want to eliminate skin cancer, then you could start by eliminating blond. This is never going to happen and would face the same objections from someone holding my viewpoints if it were suggested.

It gets better:

We do not consider either of these arguments to be intellectually serious objections to these selection practices. We frankly do not know exactly (or even approximately) how one is to distinguish between manipulations of nature, which are sufficiently benign to be sanctioned by God (say, a tonsillectomy) and those that are so intrusive as to impermissibly usurp God’s role. And, more fundamentally, playing God is a theological objection that derives its force, if any, from religious doctrine. It has no place in a secular moral and policy analysis.

This is inconsistent really, because Professor Bailey is the one talking against notions of what is “Intrinsically moral” and “Intrinsically immoral”. It seems this “Axiomatic” reasoning appears again to be consistent in Professor Bailey’s view you have to be unbiased in an “Axiomatic” fashion. All manipulations carry the same intrinsic value, well OK then lets begin and eliminate all blond people to start to get rid of skin cancer and many heterosexual people to ease the population crisis. This is something Professor Bailey would not agree with, and that is a self contradiction.

I certainly am not suggesting eliminating blond people or some heterosexual people from the gene pool (I would not agree with such actions). But it clearly illustrates the inconsistency of Professor Bailey’s argument.

The “Nazi” objection is the result of muddled thinking. Certainly, many things the Nazis did were evils of a magnitude not seen before or since. Their attempts at eugenics may be properly condemned because of the racial goals they sought to achieve and because of the forcible and inhumane nature of their experiments. This amounts to a condemnation only of Nazi eugenics.

Here we go. (This is the third time Bailey has mentioned this by the way) The limitations of the Nazi Eugenics program (Which as Bailey points out was inhumane) were the same limitations that would undermine any eugenics program, also why would Professor Bailey mention this were he not aware of the inevitable comparisons. It is also worth mentioning that the racial structure of the Nazi eugenics program were socially motivated. In the real world perpetuating only one “Race” (Regional gene pool) and removing the others reduces biodiversity, quite literally. Here the biodiversity takes the form of positive as well as negative genetic traits of a given group. Whatever group you are talking about each carries an essential library of genes that need to contribute to the human gene pool to ensure long term survival of the human race. This is where eugenics totally fails it seeks to remove that large library of genetic material from the gene pool, if humanity were an individual that would be like amputating an arm or a leg. (An interesting thought for Anne Lawrence to ponder)

The moral status of eugenics in general is not determined by the horror of the Nazi version of it.

I am now going to question Dr David Greenberg’s assertion that I was smearing Professor Bailey by claiming he advocated eugenics. Here professor Bailey agrees with my assertion that eugenics is not a “Nazi thing” but a methodology that has been around in numerous forms for quite a while. The disagreement is that Professor Bailey advocates such a methodology when it is my stated belief that such methodology is flawed. That methodology is eugenics.

Is the enterprise of, say, prenatal genetic selection to determine children's characteristics (whatever they might be) morally wrong? It is difficult to see why. Women who smoke or drink to excess while pregnant are universally condemned for, in effect, failing to engage in the proper prenatal selection of characteristics (high birth weight, etc.). Parents who read to their children are universally praised for attempting to make more likely their children's possession of certain characteristics (intellectual proficiency, etc.). Putting aside any moral questions about the method used in itself, it is not clear how, for example, prenatal genetic selection is morally distinguishable from these practices. The argument is sometimes made that allowing such interventions, because they might involve significant expense, would result in various desirable characteristics being disproportionately concentrated among the wealthy

Check out a gamete "Donation" (Trading) Website, you can get a good estimate there.

This might very well come to pass. But our economic system already results in the disproportionate possession by the wealthy of many goods that contribute to children's well-being and success (education, nutrition, medical care, etc.). This may pose a moral problem for capitalism but it hardly constitutes a legitimate moral objection to genetic or other selection per se. And, of course, it would be highly questionable to argue that the solution to this disproportionality problem would be to entirely ban more expensive education or medical care, so that, for the sake of fairness, everyone is kept at the educational and medical level of the poorest people in our society.

Well is fairness a moral question? Actually that is a valid point, or rather it is yet another factor determined by society to be an issue of morality, yet another potential "Unreasonable Objection" To Professor Bailey's "Eugenics but not as we know it".

It is worth noting that market dynamics in this area do seem to produce the same damaging sum effect as some eugenics programs did simply because they see the same characteristics as ideal.

In short, then, parental (and societal) attempts, pre- and postnatal, to ensure, to the extent possible, that children possess certain characteristics are universally encouraged, and their neglect universally condemned (so long as the characteristics are considered of the appropriate type—see the discussion of Ground 3, given later). That the mechanism involved happens to be of a newer, more "technological," or more physically invasive nature, such as prenatal genetic selection by means of abortion, has no apparent moral import (again assuming for argument's sake, as we do throughout this paper, that the method in itself raises no moral difficulties).

Actually Professor Bailey raises a good point. He illustrates just how inconsistent society really is, on the one hand they will scream blue murder the moment eugenics is mentioned, and yet they will do what the eugenicists did in order to "Enhance societal

status” for a given set of “Screened and cleared” individuals. The awkward question is whether not Professor Bailey is actually in agreement with this inconsistent society. You may find that this is indeed the core of that ever elusive “Truth” he is so fond of mentioning.

He is playing to the gallery by offering the not so comfortable face of society what it wants (The promotion of certain, let’s say preferred characteristics) but avoiding what actually motivates this ugly face of society (A pathological hatred of that which does not conform to societal demands). This is where the intellectual dishonesty really lies.

Instead of “Eugenics” it is “Freedom of choice” which sounds all cuddly and panders to the nice face of society (Society is a fickle beast). You see you use such a euphemism “Freedom of choice” and you can use the contrary motivations of society to allow society to eliminate minority (Non conforming) groups in the name of some liberal ethic.

The “Truth”? Professor Bailey systematically moves from one minority group to another, on each occasion using the contrary nature of social opinion to help society realize it’s ugly face. (The elimination of the un-favored, driven by a pathological hatred of that which does not conform) and at the same time let society make it “look good” and realize the all holy “nice face”. By calling it a liberal freedom of choice. But it is still eugenics because the underlying methodology is that of eugenics. And eugenics is neither workable nor even logical.

And Bailey’s brand is not immoral, just plain cynical.

At last we are onto his discussion about “Ground three” (It should be ground zero really)
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Ground 3—Selecting for Heterosexuality Is Wrong

Abortion. Political liberals tend, for whatever reason, to be ardent supporters of both gay rights and pro-choice programs. For this reason, we suspect that many of those who would object most vehemently to the notion of aborting a fetus because it will be homosexual are also among the strongest supporters of abortion rights.

Kerboom! I have to say that Professor Bailey makes me feel proud to be a cynic myself sometimes. He now takes almost meticulous pride in sewing together the ugly and nice faces of a fickle society. This is where Dr. Alice Dreger begins to look like the sorcerers apprentice. With Dreger people complain about being “Demeaned and dehumanized by clinical methods” and Dreger clinically reduces their complains in the same manner, and gets away with it. Now read the master of such cynicism at work.

Liberals often assert that abortion, at least at some relatively early stage of pregnancy, simply has no moral dimension and that a woman has a moral right (and must continue to have a legal right) to have an abortion for virtually any reason she considers appropriate. This position can give rise to two sorts of apparent inconsistency. First, it is difficult to reconcile moral abhorrence toward the abortion of pregnancies likely to produce homosexual children with acceptance of abortion for

virtually any other reason, however trivial or selfish it may seem.

Clever eh?

Can it plausibly be the case that a couple's having an abortion because they wish to maintain their high economic standard of living, or because the pregnancy came at an inconvenient time, raises no moral issue whatever, whereas an abortion to avoid having a homosexual child is per se evil?

The masterstroke lies in the hidden detail “Inconvenient timing” and “The cost of raising a child” are not manifestations of the nasty face of society (The pathological hatred of that which does not conform). No they are what some would regard as selfish actions what others would regard as acts of pragmatism, a sort of “necessary evil”. It is clearly established here by Professor Bailey that there is a general distaste over issues of abortion, (Mainly from a religious perspective). The clever bit follows.

We do not mean to assert here that it is not possible to draw moral distinctions among abortions based on the reasons of the people having them, or that homosexual abortions are or are not morally acceptable. What we do wish to point out, though, is a possible inconsistency in the level of moral scrutiny applied to homosexual abortions as compared with other abortions.

Meaning: That the nasty face of society (The pathological hatred of anything that does not conform) and the nice face (The need to ensure the individual has the moral right to freedom of choice) is not a contradiction, in fact not reconciling the two faces of society is the contradiction it is totally natural and good to “resolve” the contradiction..

If it is clearly wrong for people to abort gay fetuses because of their religious objections to homosexuality or because they feel (correctly or not) that being gay subjects a person to an unacceptable level of societal rejection, surely an already well-off couple's aborting a fetus to avoid the expense of a child at least raises a substantial moral question.

The Problem is that “Trivial abortions” are not motivated by social engineering, or the need to pander to a pathological hatred on the part of society towards that which does not conform.

There is, of course, an infinite number of possible ethical systems under which homosexual abortions are always wrong whereas abortions for other reasons, including the trivial and selfish, are always acceptable. (One such system might have as first ethical principles the propositions that the lives of only homosexual people are worthy of moral consideration and that life begins at conception. Another might be derived from a belief that a particular pro-gay, pro-choice activist who took this position was a prophet of God or God himself. These systems are limited

only by one's imagination and in any case could be multiplied infinitely by adding unrelated moral rules, e.g., it is wrong to wear red on Mondays, etc.) Under such a system, any possible inconsistency is eliminated by hypothesis. However, the real question is, given our commonly accepted moral principles, is any such system plausible? We do not think so.

That is the stroke of pure genius really, the moment Professor Bailey stitches two contrary faces of society together, and then goes on to say that any ethical or moral system cannot question this. But even this does not address the core question I am asking; that is the technical limitations of what he is proposing and how is it those limitations equally apply to eugenics?

Is this an ethical objection? Or simply my deciding that Professor Bailey is simply manipulating semantics to suit himself.

The second type of consistency problem faced by those who would condemn homosexual abortions while maintaining that virtually all other abortions implicate no moral issues can be illustrated by examining possible means other than abortion of avoiding having gay children.

Well no this is the original set of objections being dismissed. And again the difference between "Trivial abortion" is that it is not motivated by a pathological hatred of that which does not conform. There is a reason why Professor Bailey is constantly trying to assert there being no difference, if he repeats this often enough people will believe it. I happen not to because I can see what would motivate the abortion of a "homosexual fetus":

Consider the following possibilities:

Must We?

- 1. It is determined that eating shrimp during pregnancy will result in a gay child.*
- 2. It is determined that reading certain books to a young child will result in his or her becoming gay.*
- 3. A preconception genetic test is developed that tells couples with 100% accuracy whether their children will be gay.*

Yes all three possibilities are currently pure fiction. It is just that the third possibility is interesting, there is a new twist. Notice that Bailey said "Preconception". This does not involve abortions or any intervention using pre natal screening or in-utero gene therapies. If such a "preconception test" were devised the application of it would involved selective breeding. So what if two "Genetically incompatible" people were wanting to have children and are told they cannot because of the now very remote possibility (100% =

Science fiction) that they will create genetically homosexual babies. That throws “Freedom of choice” out of the window.

If, as maintained by this group, abortion in itself has no moral dimension, but homosexual abortion is morally objectionable, consistency requires moral objections of equal strength to (a) women not eating shrimp to avoid having gay children, (b) parents not reading certain books to their children so they do not become gay, and (c) couples who know from the preconception test that their children would be gay taking steps not to conceive.

So if they choose to conceive a “Genetically unhealthy” (Dysgenic) child, then what?

If there is nothing wrong with abortion in itself, then the only ground on which homosexual abortions can be morally condemned is that they seek to avoid gay children. Consistency would then require that all means of avoiding gay children be condemned with equal force.

I think consistency is demanding that Professor Bailey returns to what he has just said. The question being that what happens if a “Genetically incompatible” couple want to have children after some test reveals they will produce “Evolutionary mistakes”? Decide to conceive anyway.

But would members of this group really believe that women who refrain from eating shrimp during pregnancy to avoid having gay children (or those who take the other steps outlined earlier) deserve the same severe moral disapproval as women who abort for that reason? Our guess is that the vast majority of them would not.

Well eating shrimp and avoiding certain books (curious one that) do not involve a couple being told they will have a defective child if they conceive a child.

This may bespeak some unacknowledged level of moral discomfort with abortion or it may indicate simply a failure to be logically consistent. One final possibility is that our guess is incorrect. In any case, we think it is instructive to indicate the positions entailed by the conjunction of the propositions that abortion is, in itself, morally unproblematic and that homosexual abortions are morally wrong.

And I can just imagine the reader having now been distracted by the term “Preconception test”.

The Morality of Attempting to Avoid Having Homosexual Children. This brings us to the more general question of the ethical status of attempts, by whatever means (other than those that are obviously morally problematic, such as infanticide), to avoid having homosexual children. We propose to address that question by examining two broad factors (whose relevance to the morality of acts we take, as

outlined earlier, as axiomatic for purpose of this discussion): the possible motives of those engaged in selecting for heterosexual children, and the costs and benefits of such selection.

As with virtually any human action, selecting for heterosexuality might be motivated by many different factors or combinations of them. Perhaps the most obvious and, arguably, pernicious of these is the potential parent's belief that homosexuality is wrong or evil and that homosexuals are therefore (at least if all else is equal) less worthwhile or valuable people than heterosexuals.

The inevitable question would be “What other motivations would there be besides the pathological hatred on the part of society towards that which does not conform. Well you will probably find many different reasons given but ultimately they will have the same fundamental motivation.

Because, as we have assumed, homosexuality is ethically neutral, this point of view irrationally devalues and denigrates a group of human beings in a way that has resulted in much undeserved harm to that group. Those who subscribe to this view and, in particular, those who subscribe to it so strongly that they act on it (though we defer the discussion of such actions' consequences) deserve moral condemnation.

Well not really because Professor Bailey likes to subscribe to a view of behavior that is biologically determined. And the pathological hatred of anything that does not conform would in Professor Bailey's eyes be validated by animal models. Think about it social animals often use pheromones to determine “us” and “not us” in social structures. It is not uncommon for a pride, or gang, mob, troop or whatever grouping applies to kill an individual of the same species if they do not “Smell right”. This is the sort of view Bailey subscribes to.

Should our moral evaluation of such heterosexism be altered if its basis in a particular person is a sincere adherence to a religion that condemns homosexuality? One may intuitively feel that such a person is not as blameworthy as someone who condemns homosexuality for some other reason. Still, having a religious ground for the belief makes it no less irrational and no more respectful of homosexual people's legitimate claims of moral equality with heterosexuals. The nonreligious heterosexist has made a specific irrational decision on this issue. The religious heterosexist has made a general irrational decision to accept moral rules, regardless of their individual merit, because they purport to derive from a certain source.

But putting it into context the religious and secular motivations to avoid having homosexual children will still be rooted in the pathological hatred of that which does not conform, it is “natural” that which does not conform simply does not “Smell right” So the above is merely fluff and spin.

It is difficult to see why the latter decision is entitled to greater moral sympathy than the former. It may be the case, as an empirical matter, that on average religious heterosexists take positions of greater moral acceptability in areas not involving

homosexuality than do nonreligious heterosexuals. This may be relevant to an evaluation of the relative merits of the two groups as human beings, but it is irrelevant to an evaluation of the relative merits of their positions in the area of homosexuality. A religious basis, however sincere, for an indefensible and harmful moral position makes it no more defensible and no less harmful.

So why waste time trying to explain this?

This seems intuitively clear in the case of, for example, the moral acceptability of discrimination against black people. It should be just as clear when people are being discriminated against for any other irrational reason, including their sexual orientation.

Parental desires to avoid having a homosexual child may, however, arise out of motives that are less blameworthy than heterosexism. In fact, the motive may be praiseworthy.

Well let's see whether these "Less blameworthy motivations" pass the "Is it pathological hatred?" test. Which tests to see whether or not the motivation involves this pathological hatred of that which does not conform.

In attempting to avoid having a homosexual child, a parent may be motivated by a desire to spare the child the unhappiness that may arise out of living in a society that often treats homosexual people badly in a variety of ways.

No that fails the "Is it pathological hatred?" test. This reason is explicitly linked to the societal pathological hatred of that which does not conform. "Sparing" an unborn or even nonexistent child the exposure to that pathological hatred is clearly motivated by the fear of the pathological hatred. Only here it is on the part of society rather than the individual considering having the child where the root motivation lies.

Surely such a motive deserves moral approval as would an action based on the motive, at least so long as the benefits of sparing the child are not outweighed by any harms the action might cause (see discussion of costs, given later).

A Pathological hatred of that which does not conform evidently has a higher moral purpose on Professor Bailey's eyes then.

Finally, selecting for a heterosexual child may stem from motives that are neither good nor bad, but simply acceptable, from a moral standpoint. For example, parents may wish, understandably, to guarantee themselves the highest probability of one day having grandchildren.

Interesting, this motivation does pass the test.

Although homosexual people often have children, one's chances of being a grandparent would certainly seem to be maximized by having heterosexual children. The desire for

grandchildren is one that seems morally neutral and that a great many people would no doubt understand and sympathize with.

So I assume that because it passes the “Is it pathological hatred ?” test does that mean I have to consider it sympathetically. But if people want grandchildren and are told they cannot, because some preconception test says their progeny will all be “defective” and they should avoid conception, then Professor Bailey’s implied sympathy for this seems a little false really. Then yes I am sympathetic, with those who are told they cannot have “Defective children” (And thus grandchildren) at all.

Heterosexual parents may also wish to have heterosexual children for the simple reason that they wish to have children more like themselves, with whom they can more easily and completely fulfill the role of parent in connection with their children’s sexual lives.

This, believe it or not fails the “Is it pathological hatred?” test. You see the pathological hatred of that which does not conform, involved the word “Conform” Here we find the parents themselves wanting a child to conform. How often do we find families where one individual is treated badly because unlike another sibling they do not conform?

That role involves such activities as teaching, advising, empathizing, and vicariously experiencing, all of which would be, at least in many cases, facilitated by parents’ sharing the sexual orientation of their children. A comparison may be made here with a child’s religious upbringing. Catholic parents, let us say, would very often be deeply disappointed and saddened by the conversion to, say, Judaism, of their children. This is not necessarily because the parents are anti-Semites or even value Judaism less than Catholicism. Rather, such parents may wish to have children who are like themselves in this respect and with whom they can share certain feelings and experiences that are important to them. Few people would claim that such parents are acting immorally when they enculturate a child in their religion.

But in the cold logic of the underlying principle as described in evolutionary psychology, if one individual encroaches on another gang troop pride or whatever. It still results in the same consequences as smelling as if you belong to another gang, troop, pride or whatever. Don’t forget that this pathological hatred is an evolutionary descendant from territorial behavior. Considering Professor Bailey’s underlying belief in evolutionary psychology he probably does not believe what he has just said.

Similarly, heterosexual parents might wish to have heterosexual children not because they object to homosexuality but to have more in common with their children in an important area of life. Such a motive seems understandable and morally acceptable.

That is a bit vague and reads like rhetorical padding.

The second factor we wish to consider in evaluating the morality of attempts to avoid having homosexual children is the consequence of such avoidance or, more specifically, its costs and benefits. The principal benefit of parents' ability to select their children's sexual orientation is the furtherance of parental liberty. Moral condemnation of such selection would to some degree limit, or at least impose a cost on, the parents' freedom to raise the sort of children they wish to raise.

Just as against the notion of "Freedom of choice" telling potential parents they had better not have children at all using "Preconception" tests.

That freedom has traditionally been very highly valued in our society and, like any liberty, should not be restricted without good reason.

So why hint at such restrictions then? Ah well we do not mention such a minor slip up. Do we.

Possible additional benefits include the child's avoidance of the difficulties often experienced by homosexual people due to individual and societal intolerance, and the avoidance of similar difficulties that might be experienced by the siblings of the homosexual child.

Which fails the "Is it pathological hatred?" test.

One putative benefit of selecting for heterosexuality is that homosexuality is a disease whose elimination (or reduction in incidence) is therefore beneficial. We will not here enter the debate over whether homosexuality is a disease, and in fact there is no reason to do so. We have argued elsewhere that whether a given behavior or behavioral disposition is a disease is utterly irrelevant to its moral status (as well as to any other interesting question about it).

Hello, what have we here?

To determine whether homosexuality is a disease, we need to know what characteristics define a disease and whether homosexuality has those characteristics. If homosexuality is undesirable because it is a disease, it must be the case that (1) homosexuality possesses at least one undesirable property, P, and (2) P is one of the defining properties of disease.

To determine whether or not the criteria for defining something as a disease, we have to apply the "Is it pathological hatred?" test to the criteria given. Lets call this AQ1 (Awkward Question 1) Or whether the criteria given describe something very unpleasant, but pass the test of AQ1, however they are attributed wrongly to the subject being viewed under these criteria (We will call this AQ2).

So lest clarify this.

AQ1 is applied if a disease criterion was motivated by something that fails “Is it pathological hatred ?” test. An example that fails would be “*possesses at least one undesirable property*”. For the criterion to pass the “Is it pathological hatred” test it has to demonstrate that it actually presents a real health risk “A disease has the potential to cause harm” is a good example.

AQ2 is applied if there is actually no relationship between the criterion given and the subject to which that criterion is applied. An example would be something like “A disease has the potential to cause harm” which passes the test, but the application may be something like. “This criterion is satisfied because homosexual people spread AIDS” Which fails AQ2 because it is actually a rationalization trying to justify the pathological hatred. The Disease in such a case would be AIDS not the individual who may or may not have contracted it. With Bailey’s criteria we seem to read “The potential to be someone who has contracted AIDS” which “Renders a homosexual person in possession of an undesirable property”. (AQ1, Failed!) “And that homosexual people have AIDS defines them as bringers of AIDS” (AQ2 Failed!)

Seems Professor Bailey’s criteria would when applied fail on both counts then.

Clearly, though, because our moral decisions are to be based on the desirability of homosexuality, we can make those decisions using Proposition (1) alone, that is, before, and without, making the disease determination. Determining whether homosexuality is or is not a disease thus gives us no relevant new information about it.

Get to the point!

Consideration of that question is therefore fruitless, or worse, given that the proper definition of disease is a matter of some dispute. Analysis should focus instead, as we do here, on the relevant characteristics of homosexuality, that is its costs and benefits (broadly conceived), and not on whether those or other characteristics fit some definition of disease.

I imagine the critical reader is by now feeling a little tripped up. And the non critical reader is either confused as to why Professor Bailey suddenly takes a different tack after building up to a disease model. Complete with criteria and then switches back to morality issues”. Well OK we are now going to read “Costs and Benefits”

What harmful consequences or costs are to be weighed against the benefits cited earlier? As discussed earlier, selecting for heterosexual children appears to cause no direct harm to anyone. The result of such selection is that a child either never comes into being (and a being that never existed cannot be harmed) or is heterosexual rather than homosexual.

So far there is no real cost or benefit being discussed, just rhetorical padding. Professor Bailey is correct to say if someone does not exist then issues of costs and benefits do not apply to that non-existent individual. But unless it forms part of the argument it is pointless. If it used in the argument it will fail AQ2 because there is no connection between being homosexual and simply not existing, and if the premise is “Make them not exist” then again this fails AQ2 for obvious reasons. “Better they do not exist” is pathological hatred being obfuscated by quasi-existential arguments about them simply not existing in the first place. .

Even if homosexuality is not inherently inferior to heterosexuality in any way (and we believe that it is not) and even if homosexual people did not experience societal intolerance and discrimination (which of course they often do), it is quite difficult to see how being heterosexual rather than homosexual causes any harm to the child himself.

It is quite difficult to see where costs and benefits are being described as costs and benefits, it seems like a list of comments leading to a punch-line. You can hear that drum roll as Professor Bailey runs off the list and as the tension mounts for the punch-line.

If selection for heterosexuality causes any harm, that harm must be of some less direct variety and must come to people other than the child himself. But the attributions of such less direct harms or costs, moral and otherwise, made to selection for heterosexuality are not convincing.

Boom Boom!

One such potential indirect cost would involve the possibility that widespread heterosexual selection would eventually significantly reduce, or even eliminate, the homosexual population. Homosexual people may be more likely to make certain kinds of valuable contributions in areas such as the arts and obviously contribute to certain kinds of social and cultural diversity.

Hmm yes like Alan Turing who decoded the Enigma machine used by the Germans in WWII, and saved many lives.

Such contributions and diversity would be threatened by a substantial reduction in the homosexual population. And, as is the case with the extinction of a species, we might irretrievably lose valuable genetic or psychosocial characteristics possessed only, or primarily, by gay people, of whose existence or utility we are presently unaware.

Which leaves the reader asking “Well why suggest screening homosexuality in an unborn child and offering the parents to get rid of that child then?”

This is inconsistent. Surely?

In addition, if the gay population were to shrink, gay political power might lessen as well, possibly resulting in less effective governmental protection for those gays who

remain. Finally, if there were far fewer homosexual people, they might seem more unusual and aberrant to others, which might result in more intolerance.

Oh Professor Bailey will be signing up for the “My little pony fan club” if he carries on like this, but then here comes the punch-line

These costs, though certainly conceivable, seem highly speculative and unlikely to materialize

Boom Boom.

This certainly demonstrates Professor Bailey’s very limited understanding of genetics. The costs of intentionally limiting any gene pool by whatever means are actually quite considerable. I have a double recessive genetic condition, I should know. OK gay people in general do not reproduce (This is why the whole paper is such an oxymoron) but in principle it is still limiting. Certainly when you consider other contributions, look at Alan Turing for example.

(particularly given the fact that the relevant selection method could presumably be used by homosexual parents to select for homosexuality).

The Fly in Professor Bailey’s ointment but one he handles, in a very odd manner.

But even if we knew that such a drastic reduction in the homosexual population and some or all of the consequent harms discussed earlier would result from parental freedom to select heterosexual children, it is by no means clear that those harms would outweigh parents’ liberty interest in raising the sort of children they wished to raise.

Meaning: We don’t really care what the costs are to the homosexual community, “freedom of choice” is a higher principle. (That is, until pre-conception tests become available of course).

Apply that passage to the following:

A religious analogy is again instructive. Like homosexual people, Jewish people have made unique and valuable contributions to society in many areas and are a small minority of the population traditionally subject to irrational discrimination and intolerance. Suppose that for some reason the Jewish population had greatly diminished and was in danger of disappearing altogether.

Like the Jewish Tradition I belong to for example?

Suppose further that we knew of some risk-free and cost-free means (admittedly difficult to imagine) by which non-Jewish parents could bear Jewish children. Would anyone argue that non-Jewish parents would be acting immorally if they

chose to have children of their own religion rather than Jewish children despite the likely consequence of the eventual extinction of the Jewish population?

What a stupid analogy, but OK lets put this into the context in which it was meant.

Meaning: We don't really care what the costs are to the Jews, "freedom of choice" is a higher principle. (That is, until we have the forced sterilization).

At this point I need to point out this is where Professor Bailey "plays to the gallery" He has given his critics plenty of ammunition to scream "Nazi" The above passage is a blindingly obvious example. But it is clever. Because the very second one of his critics says "Why use Jewish people like this in the analogy" He can run off crying about witch hunts. Does that make Him a Nazi? Well I tend to think it makes him a very clever cynic.

You see the moment he points out this little bit of provocation that he can then deny. That it was not meant in that way, because he leaves himself that little bit of room to escape with. "You are reading nasty thing into what I am saying" he will protest. (And does)

The problem for the reader who actually knows the history is that such a tone of discussion, such rhetorical devices and lengthy (Intentional) tautologies are identical to those used by most eugenicists in the past, and yes that does include Germany in the 1930s.

We do not think that anyone would seriously take this position, the reason being that, however unfortunate the eventual extinction of the Jewish population might be, avoiding it would not be considered to outweigh the importance of parents' liberty, in each individual case, to raise the sort of children they wished to raise. This case is morally indistinguishable from that of parents choosing heterosexual children notwithstanding the possible substantial diminution of the homosexual population.

The logical reading of this being "That it is morally neutral to reduce the Jewish and homosexual population." Of course there is the escape route. "Would you really deny people's right of choice to not preserve the Jewish population or gays". (Notice the weird bit about gentile parents being forced to have Jewish children. That is the absurd escape hatch)

Would you artificially create that situation as a rhetorical device and expect not to get criticized?

A second putative indirect harm arises out of those cases in which heterosexuality is selected out of parental heterosexism (though, as discussed earlier, this is by no means the only possible motive for such selection). Certainly, heterosexism is morally indefensible. It is difficult, though, to specify exactly what harm comes from an act, otherwise harmless, that is caused by the actor's heterosexism.

The question is, then, does what Professor Bailey advocates (Eugenics but not really) constitute harm?

It is sometimes suggested that such acts further or somehow validate societal heterosexism. We see no reason to think that this is so. In fact, the only real consequence we can identify of such an act is that it notifies anyone who knows of it and of its motive that the actor is heterosexual.

So the motivation to abort, reverse engineer, fiddle with the life of a potential homosexual child can be motivated by heterosexism (Can be motivated by a pathological hatred of that which does not conform).

Murphy employs a racial analogy to condemn heterosexual attempts to avoid having gay children—just as racist acts are morally wrong, so too are heterosexual acts.

Is this why Professor Bailey played to the racist Gallery?

This may seem quite plausible because the racist acts we typically think of are clearly wrong—lynchings, Jim Crow laws, etc. Consider, however, the racist act of always choosing vanilla ice cream over chocolate because the color of chocolate ice cream reminds the racist of black people. Or suppose a racist were to wear a sign around his neck or, better, post one in a private room in his home, saying “I am a racist.”

So Professor Bailey is now describing how his escape route works, This is poetic cynicism. “I can be Heterosexual because I harm no one” and “Mc Carthyism” In one regard he is right the freedom of speech means just that, the freedom to say from the rooftops whatever view you should hold and say whatever you like.

But lets say it was a racist. On the rooftops. Saying some really nasty things about different people. They would probably get arrested under race relations or political correctness laws. (Depending on your point of view). But what would happen if they had a scientific institution behind them and then did active research to find ways of giving the people the “Freedom of choice” to ensure Afro Caribbean, Afro American or Jewish or Hispanic people were never born, And we can eventually offer these people in these communities the “freedom of choice” which means not to have children at all.

Let’s rewind a bit.

3. A preconception genetic test is developed that tells couples with 100% accuracy whether their children will be gay.

You usually do not need a “preconception test” to determine that the genetic factors that are common to a given race are going to be present in the child. Do I question the Legal mind behind all this now, Dr Aaron Greenberg?

Just because an outcome in one situation is not as evident in another, does it mean that this “Freedom of choice” means that if it is obviously inevitable that someone will be born of a given race, it is as ethical to eliminate them as it is where the outcome is rendered as inevitable via a test?

By that logic, “unfavorable people” regardless of whether the characteristics of their children being predictable by simple observation or semi predictable by hypothetical tests, should “Dutifully exercise the right to not reproduce” and if they do not, then what exactly?

Because neither the sign nor the choice of ice cream harms anyone, it is difficult to see that either compounds in any way the already existing moral wrong of the person’s racism.

There is of course a very big difference between choosing a flavor of ice cream and conducting active research into being able to prop up the policy of deciding whether or not someone has the right to be born.

The heterosexual, particularly one so extreme as to act on his heterosexism, deserves moral condemnation. The act itself, though, selecting for a heterosexual child, because it otherwise does no harm, serves only as evidence of the actor’s bad state of mind, which already exists.

Which is inconsistent because what Professor Bailey suggests is not choosing ice cream, it is research that seems at some point to involve when translated into policy “Costs” or “Harm”

The alleged cost or harm that seems to be of most concern (its analog is frequently cited as a reason to disapprove of or ban sex selection by parents) is a more general version of this “heterosexist-motive” objection, namely, that parental actions to avoid homosexual children, regardless of the parents’ motives, would reinforce, validate or legitimate, and thereby increase societal heterosexism.

Fluff and spin basically. Choosing the sex of a child is not the same as choosing a preferred flavor of ice cream. If in 1995 lots of people in Beijing simply chose one flavor of ice cream, they would not have had “killing rooms” where young girls were left to die because the state population controls, coupled with the social preference for boys meant that girls were considered wrong. But of course Professor Bailey and Aaron Greenberg would probably say that assigning the sex in utero with some weird and wonderful genetic therapy or screening for potential female births would be “more humane” and “Do not harm unlike Killing rooms”. Well yes but now there is a gender ratio crisis in China that is causing a lot of problems that were previously not even considered.

This argument obviously requires that such actions be done in a way that makes society at large aware of them. The most that argument could prove, then, is that the publicizing of such an action, rather than the action in itself, is morally wrong. In any case, the assertion that public parental avoidance of homosexual children, or its public moral acceptance, would increase general intolerance of homosexuality is, of course, an empirical prediction whose truth value is unlikely to be determined by argument alone.

Of course by comparison, the killing rooms in Beijing were a truth value that could not be determined by argument alone.

Nevertheless, serious doubt is cast on its truth by the closest analogs we can cite.

Because the analogues are conveniently ignored.

To our knowledge, the public's undoubted awareness and acceptance of parental actions to ensure that a child's religion is the same as that of his parents has done nothing to increase intolerance of any religion. Similarly, we know of no reason to believe that avoidance of genetically defective children, made possible by relatively recent technological advances, has increased general intolerance of those actually born with such defects.

Curious, Let's rewind:

Determining whether homosexuality is or is not a disease thus gives us no relevant new information about it.

I take it then that "homosexual" is a genetic defect and thus a disease in Bailey's eyes. But what are the aims of classical eugenics? Well I seem to remember this was to use selective breeding, or available technologies from screening to more recently genetic modification to "improve" humanity by removing "dysgenic" (Genetically defective) factors (Bad genes and potentially those carrying them).

Professor Bailey also seems to think that this increased intolerance is an "Acceptable cost" or "Not severe enough" or "open to question"

The precise mechanisms by which parental selection will allegedly validate and thereby increase societal intolerance are generally not made clear by the proponents of this position. The general idea, though, seems to be something like this:

1. Allowing, or failing to condemn, parental selection for heterosexuality will be generally viewed as endorsing such selection.

2. People will generally attribute heterosexist motives to those parents engaging in such selection.

4. Finally, this apparent endorsement of heterosexist motives will result in an increase in intolerance and antihomosexual acts in society at large. Each step in this argument is at least subject to serious question.

Well Let's make it clear shall we:

1. Allowing, or failing to condemn, parental selection for heterosexuality will be generally viewed as endorsing such selection.

Well it is not endorsing it, more like making the technology available, and using the possible "Endorsement" as a means to tell people that is what they want.

2. People will generally attribute heterosexist motives to those parents engaging in such selection.

Well Apply the "Is it pathological hatred?" test, the results will speak for themselves (Well already have in Professor Bailey's cited examples of these motives.) .

3. So, as a consequence of 1 and 2, allowing such selection will be seen as endorsing those heterosexist parental motives.

Which fails the AQ1 and AQ2 test.

4. Finally, this apparent endorsement of heterosexist motives will result in an increase in intolerance and antihomosexual acts in society at large. Each step in this argument is at least subject to serious question.

Well OK apply the "it is pathological hatred?" Test, which was based on the sort of models an evolutionary psychologist would use and see how Professor Bailey's contention stands up. Well Professor Bailey's contention fails. All but one such motivations fail the test, and the one that does not fail (Wanting Grandchildren) is invalidated because if the euphemism "Freedom of choice" is to be validated, it has to be consistent. It is not because pre-conception screening would remove potential parents (And by default grandparents) from the gene pool because their children would be "Genetically defective" (Dysgenic to use the correct term from eugenics).

Professor Bailey would probably answer this by saying that "Such (Heterosexist) motivations are valid" because the animal model I cite proves "It is a natural component of evolution".

Professor Bailey's assertion is open to serious question when you think about it.

As to Steps 1–3, the notion that granting someone the freedom to do something is not equivalent to endorsing that action or the motives underlying it is a simple and commonplace one.

Which mean the motive for granting such has to have benefits for the one granting this “Freedom” and that seems to me to be a potentially lucrative one, ask anyone running a gamete “Donation” (Trading) site.

Interestingly enough, two examples can be found in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. That amendment guarantees freedom of speech, regardless of the offensiveness or immorality of its content (with a handful of narrow exceptions), and freedom to practice the religion of one’s choice, even if those practices seem to most people to be incomprehensible or even harmful.

Does it mention the freedom to institute a process of eugenics? As for freedom of speech, well Dr. Alice Dreger is an expert on that one. “It is not speech but an object for study, but as for meaning it is meaningless”

Few, if any, people take this protection of freedom to indicate our society’s legal or moral endorsement of all such speech and religious practices.

So Professor Bailey should not mind people saying things he does not endorse then.

Even if allowing parents the freedom to select for heterosexuality is seen as an endorsement of the parents’ motives in so doing, it is highly questionable that those motives will be assumed to be heterosexist. As discussed earlier, there are several possible motives for wishing to have a heterosexual child, many of them not based at all on heterosexism.

All but one of Professor Bailey’s examples can be demonstrated to be motivations involving what he calls “Heterosexism” which is just one facet of a broader societal hatred of that which does not conform.

We believe that many people would understand, sympathize with, and share such nonheterosexist motives.

The one remaining motive which is “nonheterosexist” is one Professor Bailey may not sympathize with if pre-conception screening becomes available.

This obviously calls into question the notion, expressed in Step 2, that the general public would assume that selection for heterosexuality would be done out of heterosexist motives.

Well I would say that all but one of Professor Bailey's cited examples fail the "Is it pathological hatred?" test. If this argument must be repeated ad nauseam, then it must be repeatedly questioned ad nauseam.

How can Professor Bailey explain the number of times his cited "motives" which he claims are "non heterosexist" are demonstrated to be otherwise.

Even if allowing (or not condemning) selection for heterosexuality were generally viewed as a societal endorsement of heterosexism, the extent to which this would increase actual intolerance of and harm to homosexual people is not clear. That that putative increase in intolerance and harm would outweigh the value of allowing parents the freedom to raise the sort of children they wish to raise is a generally tacit and undefended assumption of the proponents of this view.

Again, Professor Bailey also seems to think that this increased intolerance is an "Acceptable cost" or "Not severe enough" or "open to question".

Stein (1998) argues that the use of orientation–selection procedures would cause people to view homosexuality as a physical disorder "by indicating that screening for homosexuality is a reasonable and sanctioned medical procedure." Again, this is an empirical prediction that, though possibly accurate, seems implausible. It is a widely known and accepted fact that many medical procedures (e.g., cosmetic surgery, sex-change operations, elective abortions) have nothing to do with disorders of any kind. We know of no reason to think that screening for homosexuality will be viewed as addressing a disorder merely because it is a medical procedure, particularly if, as seems likely, medical techniques for selecting other characteristics that are not related to disorders (e.g., high intelligence and attractive appearance) are eventually developed and used. Parents' freedom to have heterosexual children, if they so choose, may be very important to them and would not cause any direct harm to anyone.

That is Inconsistent. Professor Bailey clearly sees "Homosexuality" as a disorder of the "Dysgenic" variety. (How could he suggest genetic tests if were not so) He also describes one group of transsexual people as "Homosexual Transsexuals" so they would also be "Defective" in Professor Bailey's view.

Those who argue that that freedom should be denied on the basis of a putative long-term, indirect, incremental harmful societal phenomenon should, it seems to us, bear the burden of convincingly demonstrating that that harmful phenomenon will in fact occur.

Again this is inconsistent, the one demonstrable “nonheterosexist” motive (Wanting grandchildren) would involve telling someone they cannot try to have children because they are going to produce homosexual children. This is not really about freedom of choice. Keep repeating it and I keep repeating the questions.

But proponents of this view generally do not even attempt to make a case for the accuracy of their empirical prediction that parental selection will cause real harm by “validating” societal heterosexism. They are instead content merely to assert it. We should treat with healthy skepticism any assertion that people should not be free to live crucially important aspects of their lives in the ways they wish, which directly harm no one, on the ground that some indirect harm will eventually come to society as a result.

And Again this is inconsistent. If “Freedom to choose” really meant “The refusal to allow” as in the grandchildren example with “preconception” testing

This is true whether such arguments are used to attempt to limit the freedom of homosexual people to live their lives as they see fit or of parents to raise the sort of children they see fit to raise.

Inconsistent. Professor Bailey places a higher intrinsic value on one group over another for no other reason than he considers other group to be “Defective”

Even if increased intolerance of homosexuality did result from parental avoidance of homosexual children, that result would be the product of faulty moral reasoning.

Such as when placing a higher intrinsic value on one group over another for no other reason than society considering the other group to be “Defective”.

As argued earlier, avoiding homosexual children by morally acceptable means is, in itself, morally unobjectionable and implicates moral issues completely different from those raised by treating existing homosexual people badly.

Meaning: “Professor Bailey considers eugenics to be morally acceptable” when you pick this apart. Well I am not commenting on the moral value of eugenics, I am saying the technical limitations of eugenics make eugenics flawed and dated.

The question thus becomes whether an act that is otherwise morally acceptable becomes unacceptable because of mistaken conclusions people would draw (if in fact they would) from its public proliferation or acceptance. We would suggest that the best response in this type of situation would not be to deem the act (or, more

accurately, its publicizing) unacceptable but to educate those making the moral error. An ethical system based even in part on people's known misconceptions or errors is bound to become rife with inconsistencies and unacceptable curtailments of legitimate moral rights, as there is no reason to expect such misconceptions to follow any logically consistent pattern or to properly take into account all relevant moral factors.

The escape route when someone mentions eugenics.

It appears to be the case, then, that if allowing parents to select for heterosexuality is to be evaluated based on motive and consequence, one would be hard pressed to find it to be morally wrong.

Selling, peddling or promoting pre natal screening of this type is simply a manifestation of making money or a career out of the pathological hatred of that which does not conform. It is for someone who debates morals to determine the morality of it.

First, there are several plausible parental motives that range from morally acceptable to morally praiseworthy.

All but 1 remember.

Furthermore, parental freedom to select children's important characteristics is a highly valuable, and highly valued, liberty. Finally, selection for heterosexuality (even when done out of the worst motives) can benefit parents and children and seems unlikely to cause harm sufficient to outweigh those benefits and the value of parental liberty.

It is called de-centralized eugenics.

CONCLUSION

We believe that many people find parental selection for heterosexuality intuitively troubling or even abhorrent. We also believe, however, that this is one of those intuitions that does not stand up to rational analysis. The general enterprise of attempting to influence what a child will be like cannot be objected to. Raising a child consists exactly in attempting to dictate what that child will be like in a multitude of ways. Virtually everyone believes, and rightly so, that it is, indeed, a primary duty of parents to take steps, both pre- and postnatal, to assure that their children possess certain characteristics and do not possess others. Assuming that a particular method of selection, in itself, poses no moral problem, its use, as a general matter, cannot be faulted. Even assuming, as we do, that homosexuality is completely unobjectionable morally and not inherently inferior to heterosexuality in any way, the specific enterprise of selecting for heterosexuality seems to be morally acceptable. Again assuming that the method employed in itself raises no moral problem, one cannot consistently object to its use in selecting for heterosexuality with any greater

force than one would object to, for example, (1) parents genetically disposed to homosexuality refusing to conceive; or (2) parents refusing to eat a certain food while pregnant or to expose a child to certain books, if such actions were found to increase the likelihood of a child's being homosexual. These two actions do not seem to pose serious moral problems. More importantly, selection for heterosexuality may tangibly benefit parents, children, and their families and seems to have only a slight potential for any significant harm. Further, parents making such selections may well be doing so out of good, or at least neutral, motives. And even when the selection is made out of the worst motive, parental heterosexism, the act itself serves only as evidence of that bad motive and does nothing to compound it. Given this, we see no reason, in the case of the selection of a child's sexual orientation, to deprive parents of the freedom (taken for granted in a multitude of other contexts) to determine what their children will be like.

CONCLUSION:

With all due respect to Dr David Greenberg (Who prompted this overview) I would like to point to one of those little lists Professor Bailey mentions in his summing up.

*(1) parents genetically disposed to homosexuality refusing to conceive; or
(2) parents refusing to eat a certain food while pregnant or to expose a child to certain books, if such actions were found to increase the likelihood of a child's being homosexual.*

The first and second points raised here are very different. The first point says clearly "Choosing not to conceive" To your average couple that means "Not have children at all" As Bailey has consistently failed to mention those technologies where gametes can be tested.. This is what it would mean to the average reader. I agree it would be rather tentative to describe Professor Bailey's "methodology" to eugenics on the basis on that alone. But it is evident that Bailey uses a model of homosexuality (It seems male homosexuality, if this is consistent with the rest of his writings) as a "Disorder" in a biological context, or "Dysgenic" context to someone who knows eugenics.

There is also one glaring inconsistency in the text. If professor Bailey is so desperate to dissociate what he is doing with eugenics because of the "Nazi Connotations" Why does he berate those who would see eugenics in an emotive or moral context, to the point of "playing to the gallery". Do he and his supporters have an emotive issue with the term itself?

If so may I point out that (As Bailey himself states) that eugenics was not defined by the activities of the Nazis in the 1930's This was Racial Eugenics. And people who proposed eugenics in the working context actually did not consider racial eugenics to be the "genuine article" They held the same view of "Class Eugenics" (In the 1920's)" and to some extent "Behavioural eugenics". Eugenics tend not to work mainly because of the

technical limitations. Unfortunately there are many practicing geneticists who offer ideas of single gene models to most human traits. This is a hangover from the eugenicist's methodology.

It is now known that because human beings have less than 40,000 genes, which differs from the earlier estimates (Pre Human Genome Project) of 100,000. The genome is a dynamic system that usually expresses via structures of dependencies. That is single gene removal does not always work. Nor does single gene modification.

So why Professor. Bailey's fear of being "Branded" a eugenicist? A modern day eugenicist would probably consider his "Methodology" to be flawed because it would be behavioural eugenics. I consider Professor. Bailey's methodology to be flawed because it shares these flaws in common with all branches of eugenics, be they "Pseudo eugenics" or not.

It is not eugenics that are the issue, eugenics are a set of methodologies with a bad reputation, as well as technical flaws, but the interesting thing is that the bad reputation stems from the "normative aims" of eugenics. The reason eugenics went out of favour was because some took the normative philosophy to the extreme. (The Nazis being the prime example with Racial Eugenics). The question should not be "Is Professor Bailey" a eugenicist?" As far as I am concerned what he proposes is a form of de-centralized eugenics. And there are examples of this in common use today (Mainly in the commercial sector, gamete traders being an example).

I do not consider referring to Professor Bailey's methodology to be eugenics to be a slur on him or his character, I think it badly informs his understanding of genetics but does not make him the pariah. There are branches of eugenics that are normative and others that are considered therapeutic. (Personally I regard them all flawed in one respect or another, again a technical criticism.)

We have to apply a different means to scrutinise Professor Bailey's work. The question as to whether what Bailey proposes eugenics is irrelevant. It looks like a branch of behavioural eugenics and will stand or fall on the scientific validity of it as a branch of eugenics, and that would be under scrutiny from others who adhere to that methodology.

Getting angry because I call his method a branch of eugenics is not a valid reason to be angry. I simply regard eugenics as a methodology, a flawed methodology but a methodology all the same.

The scrutiny we need to apply, is summed up in the question "Is Bailey's methodology normative, and if so to what degree?" Well the answer to that would be a resounding "Yes". I get the impression he does know some others who adhere to eugenic methodology be that a fully fledged branch or simply the hang over expressed in the work of some geneticists, I think a card carrying eugenicist would consider his methodology to be an embarrassment. Because it is so hyper-normative.

“What are the parental motivations are the heterosexist or not, well” Followed with “Deliberate tautology, spin, obfuscation, berating the moral, provocative metaphor and rationalization” In fact yes it is the battery of literary devices used by a “Pseudo-eugenicist” trying to convince people that his branch is good and works knowing people will question it stridently.

The final question is “Does that Make Professor J Michael Bailey a card carrying Nazi” Well no, it does not. Despite all the provocative remarks he does clearly distance himself from the Nazi movement. What he says does bear some similarities to Nazi ideas. But by the same token many forms of eugenics pre dating Fascism had their similarities. Despite what I have said, Bailey’s methodology is not racial eugenics. It would be classified as a de-centralised form of behavioural eugenics, and it is hyper normative. And it is that he considers to be a fundamental truth. And you may by now have noticed I am using his own literary devices and approaches that can be read either way. With the clear exception of “I do not see Bailey as a card Carrying Nazi” and “The methodology Bailey applies is a branch of eugenics”

Eugenics, while flawed, was a misused and abused methodology. Eugenics gained a very bad reputation because of racial eugenics in particular, and the “Health” eugenics project “Tiergartenstrasse 4” that proceeded it and it was way too over normative. Bailey does not advocate race eugenics. (His methodology would be hated if he did). Bailey does not do a pseudo “Health” eugenics either. He simply regards sexual minorities as having “Dysgenic” properties (As a eugenicist would define it) and regards them to be subject to hyper normative approaches. The Hyper normative bit is the problem as well as the underlying flaws in his methodology. Bailey differs from that which he is accused of. Some may consider the difference trivial some would say he is totally different. To me a scientist talking like Bailey is not a Nazi.

He is just someone who does not know his genetics all that well nor knows the history of eugenics as a methodology (Albeit flawed methodology).

I do not consider calling him a eugenicist to be a slur, that is a comment on his methodology, I not consider him to be a Nazi because he does not preach racial and pseudo-health eugenics. I think the criticisms lie in that he is very normative in his approach, plays literary games to obfuscate this fact and his methodology is just another form of eugenics. It is his hyper normative view of minority groups that get him called a “Nazi” I suggest Dr. David Greenberg could take that up with his other critics. Is the hyper normative elements to what Bailey is preaching significant to his accusers? Well yes they are very significant.

Hyper normative reasoning is the hallmark of Bailey’s writings. He presents a dysgenic model of homosexuality. He then turns his attention to transsexual people and links them to homosexuality, and by default defines them as having the same dysgenic properties, Those transsexual folks not defined as homosexual Or “Autogynephiles” have dysgenic sex drives (In this case are fetishist) according to Bailey. He then moved onto Bisexual people and then it became: “If they are sexually turned on by X they are dysgenic if not

they are not dysgenic. But either way no one is bisexual, that cannot exist, it is not normal, they are liars”.

The way I read that, anyone (Who is male, by his definition) who is not heterosexual, and does not have sex in a very specific “This bit goes here” manner. Is “A genetic defect” (Dysgenic).

In this branch of eugenics, the De-centralized, behavioural eugenics of Professor Bailey. Anyone “Male” who does not conform to some ultra strict definition of what a heterosexual male is, is “Genetically defective”

The only other eugenicist to take a stance and gender bias like that was Adolph Brandt. Is the hyper normative element Bailey playing to the gallery? If so what purpose does Bailey actually serve?

I think Bailey needs to reconsider the hyper normative aspect of his methodology, because that does get him accused of many things and compared with people he really would not want to be compared with. If Dr David Greenberg has an issue with that assessment, well he should take that up with Bailey’s accusers. As I said, Bailey’s 2001 paper speaks for itself.

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